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l 
Anglo-based governance -
rules versus flexibility: 
A continual debate? 
by 
Suzanne Young & Vijaya Thyil 
Anglo governance systems rely on a number of controls to align the ·interests of 
shareholders and boards of directors. Various models (Easterbrook 1996; Robins 2006) are 
put forward in discussing these controls but generally we can refer to them as market 
control, regulatory control, and political and cultural control. Agency theory (Eisenhardt 
1989; Fama & Jens.en 1983) proposes that these control mechanisms are necessary as 
human nature is such that directors and managers act in a self-interested and boundedly 
rational manner in decision making, which can result in sub-optimality. 
But even within a singular governance system we find that each country uses different 
control mechanisms to varying degrees - each with its own foci and priorities, 
characteristics and drivers of change. For instance, in discussing the types of regulatory 
controls, the US governance system is referred to as rules-based whereas the Australian 
and UK systems are referred to as principles-based (Clarke 2007). A rules-based system 
requires companies to comply; whereas, a principles-based system allows companies to 
either comply or explain why they have not. In this way there is more flexibility in the 
principles-based system compared to the rules-based system. Clarke (2007) criticises the 
rules-based system, arguing that rules can set a lower base level as they require all 
members to act according to minimum standards of practice, which ultimately become 
minimum acceptable practices in order to gain broad acceptance. He claims setting 
minimum standards of practice simply leads to the creation of new and imaginative ways 
to get around the rules; whereas a principles-based system, in not setting standards, 
encourages improvement over time in order to meet the expectations of the stakeholder 
· community at large. Clarke does however add that the introduction of tougher rules in 
the USA has improved reporting and governance behaviour. Pallas (~004) argues that a 
reliance on rules and compliance is fraught with peril, but further argues that objective 
standards are required to facilitate meaningful comparative analysis, to bring about 
discipline and to ensure shareholders receive a fair share of rewards. These are just a few 
examples of conflicting opinion and on-going debate about the benefits of both systems, 
and with the 2008 financial turmoil seeming to originate.in the USA under the regulatory 
approach, questions continue to arise as to whether more regulation is the answer. 
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In attempting to answer this question this chapter first broadly examines the 
characteristics of Anglo governance systems before then des~ibing the regulatory 
changes of the early· 21st century that occtrrred as a resW.t of a problematic security 
market. It reviews many commentators who argue both for and against increased 
regulation, before introducing a behavioural perspective as a different path to the 
increasing calls for tighter regulation. In subsequently discussing the inherent flexibility 
of the principles-based approach to governance, the chapter. argues for enhanced 
disclosure, greater transparency, enhanced shareholder voice, and· a move to greater 
stakeholder and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) focus. In conclusion the chapter 
calls for a more holistic approach to governance that addresses these concerns and 
explores the key drivers of governance reform. 
Anglo governan!=e systems 
Anglo governance systems operating in the USA, UK and Australia have specific 
characteristics that are referred to in total as a market-based system. Corporations 
operating in this system focus on maximising returns to shareholders, and in doing so are 
subjected to the market, which operates to ensure both efficiencies and effectiveness of 
managerial and board decisions. The market evaluates the willingness and ability of 
corporations to pay investors and adjusts the current price of stock as a result. As firms 
raise new money they must pay the rate of return appropriate to current strategies and 
risk, as judged by the market. This assumes that the general populace has faith in the · 
market, and that shareholders are willing to invest. When investors lose faith, as we have 
seen occurring in 2008, share prices fall on the back of decreasing demand. In this process 
it is assumed that managers make rational investment decisions and choose whether to 
raise funds through equity, and that if shareholders have faith in the market they will 
purchase shares. Otherwise companies have to look to banks and other financial 
intermediaries for capital . injection, and these instrumentalities in also judging the 
strategies and risks of the company set an appropriate interest rate. The market therefore 
evaluates and juqges, resulting in interest rate and share price effects. We refer to the 
effect of this on managerial actions as 'market discipline' which it is often claimed is 
greater than the discipline of formal 'governance' devices. 
This market discipline, or control, aligns shareholders', directors' and managers' interests 
in a number of ways: through the market for corporate control, through product markets 
and through labour markets. Corporate control operates in such a way that inefficient 
operating is reflected in share price and in takeover activity. It proposes that shareholders 
can exit the market if they lose faith in the market, and in particular can sell their shares 
irt corpO'rafions ·if directors and _managers make deci&ions that reduce their wealth. In 
addition, product markets also exhibit controls over managerial behaviour ensuring that 
corporations compete effectively in the market for goods and services or risk losing 
business. Moreover labour markets act as a control device as any reduction in shareholder 
value due to management inefficiencies may lead to decreases in their employment 
opportunities through reputation loss. 
But in practice, inefficiencies in market control have led to other actors in the governance 
system such as professional associations and government, introducing professional and 
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regulatory controls. The result is a broadening and strengthening of controls over the 
behaviour of directors and managers so that their focus on shareholder wealth is 
maintained and self-interest is pushed aside. Easterbrook (1996, p. 70) explains 
Entrepreneurs make promises to investors [and] if these promises are not 
optimal...then ·investors pay leJS _ and entrepreneurs ... bear- costs -of sub-
optimality ... [However] this mechanism depends on investors being able to evaluate 
promises made to them ... so when markets are inefficient some substitute must be 
found. 
Inefficient markets are evident, for instance, when a lack of transparency and disclosure 
renders directors and managers with much greater access to information and knowledge 
about the activities of the company than investors and potential investors have - referred 
to as information asymmetry. In such cases, legislation and professional accounting and 
auditing standards, and organisational codes of conduct and ethics all act to bring about 
an equalisation of knowledge through enhanced disclosure requirements and behaviour 
controls. Clarke (2007). explains that the Anglo governance system based on disclosure 
uses regulation to ensure that full information is provided to dispersed shareholders so 
that they can make informed investment decisions. In general, managerialists argue that 
strong legal rules are necessary to temper the enormous power that managers have and to 
ensure power is exercised consistently in the interests of shareholders (du Plessis et al. 
2005). 
Even with these varied controls, in the 1990s we witnessed numerous frauds, corporate 
scandals, and failures of standards and codes. We have seen stock options being used as a 
vehicle for huge personal gains, profits being inflated to placate stock market analysts, 
and deception used to allay commentary by analysts on less than expected performance. 
As Paul Volcker US Federal Reserve (2002) stated 'in light of the Enron Affair and the 
seemingly endless barrage of news about other firms restating profits, artificially 
embellishing revenues and creating obscure "special purpose vehicles" conveniently off 
their balance sheets, no one can reasonably doubt that there is a crisis in the accounting 
and auditing profession' (Robins 2006, p. 36). The financial turmoil of 2008 has resulted in 
many different responses such as enhanced monitoring of governance principles, 
enhanced regulation, greater disclosure and caps on executive remuneration. Macello 
Bianchi (2008) Chairman of the OECD stated that the OECD' s task is to address 
immediate reactions to malpractices and to establish a long-term road map for effective 
implementation and monitoring of governance principles. In this way they 'play an 
important role in fostering a sound business culture and rebuilding confidence 
discredited by bad corporate governance practices in individual companies'. Extensive 
reporting in the business press has seen calls for greater independence of boards (Tudway 
2008), improved gov:emance practices, heightened monitoring of accounting standards 
" and tightening of regulation-(Hughes 2008). In relation to salaries there has been a push 
for enhanced disclosure of the reasoning behind the amount of executive salaries, and 
increased pressure on institutional shareholders to vote against excessive salaries and 
disclose their voting patterns (Koch 2008; West 2008). Moreover Waring (2008) writes of 
corporate governance failures in liberal market economies being based on organisations 
having a short-term business focus, perverse incentives and questionable managerial 
decision making. · 
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Regulatory control enhanced in the 2000s 
In the 1990s, a strong consensus emerged amongst policy makers and industry observers 
that. existing management practices and government oversight were insufficient ·to 
promote a weU.fonctioning and sound security market (Bertus et al. (forthcoming in 
Corporate Ownership and ControQ). This resulted in the tightening of regulatory control in 
the USA through the Sarbanes-Oxle:y Act (SOX) 2002 and in amendments to the 
Corporations Act - Corporate Law Reform Act 2004 (CLERP 9) in Australia. The SOX has 
numerous features to strengthen control focusing on three areas: executive compensation, 
shareholder monitoring and board monitoring (Holstrom & Kaplan 2005). Specific 
features include tightening of accounting standards and enhancing external auditor 
independence from management, improving the responsibility of CEOs and senior 
management, greater disclosure of internal controls and codes of ethics, certification by 
the CEO and CFO of all annual and quarterly reports, requirements of auditor 
independence, establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), and new sta,ndards for company audit committees. In general the SOX Act 2002 
is quite prescriptive in its approach in response to the failures mentioned above. 
In particular it requires that 
• The CEO and CFO give up any profits from bonuses and stock sales during the 
12 months that follow a financial report that is then restated due to misconduct. 
• 
• 
• 
Executives report sales or purchases of stock within 2 days; and provide greater 
disclosure of off-balance sheet financing and special purpose entities. 
Improvements are made in board monitoring . 
Overall increases in management and board responsibility for financial 
reporting and criminal penalties for misreporting. 
Commentators (Holstrom & Kaplan 2005, p. 83) in speaking of the SOX Act 2002 have 
argued that board behaviour is affected through heightened monitoring, and should lead 
to more independence and inquisition by the board of directors of managerial actions. 
They concluded that despite the problems, US corporate governance has performed very 
well and that any more regulation would be costly and counterproductive and lead to 
inflexibility and fear of experimentation. Others have questioned the effects: Clarke (2007) 
reports a survey of 274 finance managers which found that whilst 55 per cent agreed that 
SOX increased investor confidence in financial reports, 44 per cent agreed that financial 
reports were more reliable and 32 per cent agreed that it helped prevent or detect fraud, 
only 14 per cent agreed that the benefits exceeded costs. Indeed Zhang (2005, cf Thomsen 
2008) reports that in the first year of implementation there was an increase in costs of at 
least 53 per cent comprised of both internal and external costs plus audit fees. And it has 
been reported (Thomsen 2008) that additional costs have spurred organisations to delist 
from US capital markets. 'The level of work required to comply with the SOX regime is 
far greater than what would be required in alternative systems as in the UK or in 
Australia' (Young & Thyil 2008b, p. 131). Notwithstanding that, a survey of CFOs 
conducted by Deloitte Consulting found that 50 per cent said regulatory changes had not 
had· a big effect on finance function and new rules were insufficient to prevent repeats of 
big corporate collapses like Enron and HIH (Robins 2006). 
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that questions have been raised about whether legislative changes will bring 
provements in behaviours and conduct. Phil Chronican, .the CFO of Westpac, 
reference to enhanced legislative controls, that technically, 'it has made no 
·'_.difference. Previously I wrote to the Westpac board personally certifying the 
· of the company's accounts. Now that document.is public and US criminal 
apply if I break the law. My workload has increased only slightly' (Schmidt 
.eted in Robins 2006, p. 40). Waring (2008, p. 158) sununarises 'there is an ongoing 
·te in the corporate governance literature as to whether Sarbanes-Oxley was an 
ropriate legislative response to these failures; a question only time and experience 
,. lit capable of resolving'. And questions have now been raised in 2008 about whether 
,~ _ ~$ anced regulation has had the intended effects on governance practices in light of 
:~'ci,~estionable lending practices of banks and financial intermediaries. Further, it has been 
;~ueried whether this focus on meeting particular regulatory requirements has meant that 
'directors and managers have concentrated on ticking the box rather than evaluating 
broader strategic and risk management approaches. Indeed Former Federal Reserve 
chairman Alan Greenspan confessed to a congressional committee that 'he had made a 
mistake in thinking the market's self-interest would protect shareholders, ignoring the 
forces of primary narcissism' (Gettler 2008). 
In Australia, even operating from a principles-based approach, CLERP 9 enhanced 
regulatory control and focused more narrowly on auditor independence, enhanced 
disclosure, transparent shareholder meetings and whistleblowing (Clarke 2007). The 
legislation has strengthened financial reporting, ending an era of self-regulation in favour 
of the Financial Reporting Council. It has introduced International Accounting Standards, 
established the Corporate Governance Council, reviewed the performance and 
accountability of regulatory authorities such as ASIC and APRA, and has established the 
group of 100 CFO Code of Conduct (Robins 2006). 
The Act, in a focus on audit reform, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
provides auditing standards with the force of law 
enhances disclosure of remuneration and links to corporate performance, with 
shareholders having a non-binding vote and approval of termination payments 
legislates for continuous disclosure of information that may materially affect 
share price 
enhances shareholder participation through embracing technology, notice of 
annual general meetings, electronic proxy votes, and disclose of directors pre-
positions 
provides for protection of whistleblowers 
• improves information in the prospectus. 
In addition, in 2002, to enhance and strengthen the principles around governance, the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) introduced guidelines which are not mandatory, but 
listed companies must disclose the extent they are followed (ASX 2007). These guidelines 
cover areas such as: statements of matters reserved to the board and delegated to senior 
management; independence of directors and .Chair; · disclosure of. directors' tenure; 
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establishment of code of conduct; and recommendation. that non:-executive · diiectors 
. . J . 
shottld consider meeting independently of management. 
When discussing Australia's principles-based approach, there have been conflicting 
opinions expressed by commentators, which often arises from self-interest. For instance, 
in arguing against tightening of rules, Greg Larsen CEO of the Australian Society of 
Certified Practicing Accountants (ASCPA) stated: 'Fundamentally there is nothing wrong 
with Australia's financial system, which in some cases is leading world's best practice' 
(Harris 2002, cited in Robins 2006, p. 41). But politically speaking the ASCPA as a key 
lobby group has evident self-interest in representing accountants and auditors who have 
resisted any external tightening of rules and regulations and criticised the rotation of 
audit teams (not firms) every 5 years, audit independence, and reporting of non-audit 
services (Robins 2006). Furthermore the Australian Directors of Corporate Governance 
International rejects the use of the ASX as a model and argue~ that it has a poor record of 
proposing governance reform. Others have commented that difficulties arise as ASX 
listing rules are in fact non-binding and there are conflicts of interest as the ASX is a listed 
company itself (Robins 2006). Robins (2006, p. 36) adds more generally that Australian 
responses to corporate scandals are considered to be 'ill-coordinated and weak, when 
compared with the apparent rigour of Sarbanes-Oxley'. Explanations provided relate to the 
voluntary nature of codes of conduct compared to prescriptive legislation and the longer. 
time-lines and incorporation of public debate and input from the accounting profession, 
businesses and shareholder organisations. Du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric (2005) argue 
that whilst Australia's regulatory framework satisfies the OECD principles of good 
corporate governance on the two bases of promotion of transparent and efficient markets, 
and consistency with rule of law principles, it fails on the third which is clear axticulation 
of division of responsibilities among the different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities. Oarke (2007), and Digman and Galanis (2004) add that there is 
some evidence that this continuing division of regulatory powers has diminished the 
power of regulation, limited the pressure on company disclosure relative to other 
countries, and resulted in a hands-off approach to infringements. 
Despite these criticisms, Young and Thyil (2008b) cite data from interviews where 
respondents were of the opinion that Australian governance processes and 
implementation are far better than in the USA, although the interviewees tended to 
believe that the regulatory path of the USA as a response to the severe collapses that 
occurred is understandable. 
Behavioural approaches 
In addition to the push from regulators and those arguing for more legislation, another 
driver of change in governance comes from those arguing for a broader stakeholder 
perspective with the accompanying stakeholder influence on corporate behaviour. darke 
(2007) argues that the increasing demand for CSR is another pressure on the governance 
system. Support for this comes from Waring (2008) who argues that in the Anglo 
governance systems, legal duties and responsibilities of directors should be enlarged to 
include enhancing and balancing stakeholder interests. 
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In this vein, Young and Thyil (2008b) cite evidence that actors in the governance system 
such as directors, managers and consultants believe that it is leadership that drives the 
corporate responsibility agenda top-down and that organisational culture, strategy and 
conu:i:iittee structures are important in achieving this. 
. . 
Similarly Graeme Samuel (Accq states that governance requires the right mix of 
personalities, expertise, commitment and leadership, and that over-regulation will kill 
entrepreneurial spirit, crush innovation and shift resources towards compliance rather 
then staying ahead (Samuel 2003). Others (Buffini 2002; Robins 2006) in arguing for a 
broader, but not regulatory, approach claim that governance has to move beyond 
checklist templates, and that it is impossible to regulate for ethics. 
In this way it is important that the governance systems and processes should also align 
with the culture of the firm. Young and Thyil (2008b, p. 133) provide an example from 
their interviews of directors: 
I defy anyone to put in any set of rules that would have stopped those idiots ... 
Basically the fault of HIH was that they had a board of dorks... and no amount of 
corporate governance rules, regulations, reporting, no amount of checks and balances 
you could have put over the top to avoid those problems. Those people and (their) 
organisation culture (mattered). 
They add that the ethical stance and moral codes of conduct of individuals, especially top 
management, are also important in this regard, with evidence from their interviews: 
If you have got the right sort of people in the place you are not going to have a 
problem. If they have the right moral fibre, you are just not going to have a problem. 
I mean like HIH. All that behavior was already illegal. It was already outside the rules 
of listed companies and good disclosure and ethical business management practices. It 
is not as if that was perfectly acceptable behavior and attitudes have moved on. The 
fact is the rules were there but they weren't being followed. (Young & Thyil 2008b, 
p.134) 
Other influences on governance arise from history, established practices and national 
culture. Clarke (2007, p. 266) concludes that 'as pressures to conform to international 
standards and expectations increase, the resilience of historical and cultural differences 
will continue'. On the same theme, Young and Thyil (2007; 2008a) argue that in 
attempting to understand governance models, a holistic view is more appropriate, one 
which reflects its multidisciplinary nature, reflecting macro factors such as cultural, 
historical, legal and national frameworks as well as micro factors such as vision and 
strategy, behaviours and codes, leadership and stakeholders. And Mayer (2000, p. 9) 
concludes that 'there is no single dominant system [and] ... there may indeed be benefits 
to diversity, partictilarly in light of our current state of ignorance about the comparative 
merits of different systems· [and] ... regulators should be ... encouraging the emergence of 
different types of financial and corporate arrangements rather than being restrictive'. So 
. whether based on rules or principles, each country's governance system reflects its own 
history, culture, legislature, social systems and environment. 
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Flexibility 
0
Such flexibility evident in a system that reflects these differences is apparent in the 
principles-based system with Young and Thyil (2008b) providing evidence that 
companies· are just begiruting to take up the flexibility in the system and adapting 
governance statements to suit their own situations. Initially they claimed the firms simply 
followed the basic tenets and structures required by the ASX and the regulatory bodies, 
but over time, they have realised the flexibility inherent in the system and started to 
customise it according to their own requirements. 
This points to the fluid nature of governance, where it is claimed that governance evolves 
as the market evolves and it is not possible to reach a state where it could be termed as 
being 'exactly right'. The flexibility accorded by the principles-based approach, whilst 
often lauded by firms, also means that firms need to go through a trial-and-error process 
until they identify a system that is right for them. 
In this vein Young and Thyil (2008b, p. 132) in discussing whether the rules-based 
approach will improve governance cite one ·consul ting firm: 
I doubt it. Cost benefit analysis suggests that the costs far outweigh the benefits of it. 
An American company will fail again and SOX is not a guarantee that, that won't 
lzappen. Contrast that with the Australian system where Australian companies are 
free to find their own solution ... I think it is the more realistic approach. As I say, 
there is no silver bullet or no magic wand that will prevent failures happening. And! 
think the American approach is very much tick- the-box. I think the approach followed 
by the 'comply or explain' countries is more realistic and more flexible for the different 
needs of different organizations, at different stages of their development'. 
Disclosure, transparency and shareholder voice 
Shareholder influence and voice and their effect on improved disclosure and 
transparency are also evident in the principles-based system. But whether this is a 
proactive approach has been questioned. Young and Thyil (2008b, p. 133) cite interview 
data that argues that even though there is a push from investors it is not necessarily being 
picked up by firms. 
There is not much incentive for finns to become more transparent and provide greater 
disclosures than what is mandated by law, as the customers and general public do not 
seem to be interested in knowing more about governance,. nor do they want to 
actively participate in the running of the firm. · · · · 
Notwithstanding that, there is a change that is occurring in this arena with more active 
participation on the horizon, as Australian shareholders realise that their voice matters, 
with the Australian Shareholders Association, for instance, raising the profile of investor 
concerns and increasing their influence. 
And in regard to specific issues around. disclosure of executive ·Temuneration, there fs 
evidence of demands and impetus for action arising from the public due to media 
exposure of specific acts of companies. Excessive compensation, remuneration and 
retirement payouts are some areas where the public outcry is greatest, and it is invariably 
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!i) · t of the media coverage and information dissemination - although the investors 
,_,. ublic appear to be reactive, rather than proactive. Their activism is limited to issues 
- . their occurrence and after they have been highlighted, rather than exhibiting voice in 
uencing aspects of governance that affect business value and then, through that, the 
Un.eration of executives. ~ 
·~y drivers of the Australian governance system 
'i· 
.,,:Governance systems are not static and their fluidity is influenced by many factors in the 
f environment. Firstly, from a control perspective, the corporations law (CLERP 9) is clearly 
~an impetus for change and has put greater liability on companies and greater focus on 
governance. 
Secondly, moving away from compliance, an important recent development has been· 
broadening the perspective from shareholder primacy to a stakeholder view of the firm. 
But an interesting point to note citing interview data is that 
.. . this issue isn't actually driven by any moral or ethical type guidelines, but it is 
because the landscape has actually changed in that companies can no longer act solely 
for their shareholders with complete disregard for other stakeholders because of what 
we now term the social license ... If they actually undertake activities which endanger 
that social license then it actually creates quite a real risk to their business. (Young & 
Thyil 2008b, p. 134) 
Thirdly, firms are being held accountable for putting rhetoric into practice through 
reputation and risk management and, the added driver at a time of skills shortage, 
through being an employer of choice and leader in sector. Such emerging public pressure 
is evident as investors demand higher standards both individually and institutionally. 
But on a cautionary note, Young and Thyil (2008b) argue that it is yet unclear whether 
public demands will metamorphose into action on the part of both companies and 
investors. So even though firms appear to be in the process of assessing what actions are 
considered socially responsible, there is a lack of consensus on what is socially acceptable. 
Fourthly, the normal evolution of firms and the growth and maturity of societies and 
economies in which they operate push changes in governance. As Young and Thyil 
(2008b, p. 135) cite interview da:ta: 
I think it's the normal evolution of corporations and the corporate structure. And I 
say that because if you go back to the start of the last century and companies and 
company meetings, board meetings and relations between senior members and junior 
management and the workers were formal and very structured. As the century wore 
on... and as... we are now much more informal, no _less structured in a way. And 
governance is just part of the same. It's the way corporations· and societies deVelop 
over time. ' 
Conclusion 
An important implication is the need . for organisations to operate from a holistic 
perspective on corporate governance, :p:loving beyond the 'tic;k-the-box' mentality to 
analysing key drivers and variables that are critical to governance effectiveness in their 
19 
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own contexts. As Letza et al. (2008) argue, corporate governance is a. social, processual 
and relatively enduring reality driven by both internal impetuses and external 
environmental d~cs - rather than a pure economic or fixed reality, and hence it 
cannot be studied in isolation from non-economic factors such as power, legislation, 
culture, social relations and institutional contexts. Young and Thyil (2008a) have 
elaborated on this holistic perspective of governance and argued that a multi-dimensional 
approach is required that extends the analysis from a prescriptive regulatory approach 
that limits actions, to one that is more descriptive and provides an explanation of why 
actions occur and decisions are made. They argue that an. emphasis on control. and 
regulation will not stop governance failures if it is not set within a governance framework 
that encapsulates regulation, labour product and capital markets, and behavioural, 
cultural and ethical considerations. As Gettler (2008) citing Professor Long notes, the 2008 
turmoil has been caused by self-interest, delusion, collusion and turning a 'blind eye with 
organisational perversion evident through the deadly sins of pride, greed, envy, wrath, 
sloth and neglect. 
The next important implication is the evolving nature of governance and the need for 
customisation by firms. It is important that firms understand their environment, both 
internal and external, and map the implications of environmental change on their 
governance frameworks. As emphasised clearly in the ASX corporate governance 
principles and recommendations (2007, p. 3), 'corporate governance practices evolve in 
the light of the changing circumstances of a company and must be tailored to meet those 
circumstances'. For instance, it is evident from the interview data presented by Young & 
Thyil (2008b) that the mining companies understand the implications of their 
environment and the increasing importance of CSR on risk and reputation and embed 
these considerations in their governance frameworks. Importantly, in light of current 
events the actions and understanding of the financial sector can be questioned. As Gettler 
(2008) states: 
The capacity to deny reality in the face of warnings tell us how banks, intoxicated ~ 
years of leverage, were allowed to get away with financial holdings that were worth a 
lot less than they claimed, and how they managed to convince investors that they were 
rolling in it when they were haemorrhaging. 
In this vein, the importance and effect of CSR and sustainability as a driver of governance 
has been raised, with questions about the level and ·practicability of incorporating CSR 
into the principles-based approach to governance. We have seen principl~s .f9rmed 
around the stakeholder perspective in governance· codes in the UK and Australia, but 
operationalising and integrating them into . the governartce framework and the firm's 
strategy and operations is still problematic. Waring (2008) argues for the stakeholder 
approach to be given more weight through regulation and incorporation into directors' 
duties. 
Another important conclusion that emerged is that the principles-based approach is 
clearly favoured in A.ustralia over the rules-based approach. As Solomon (2007, p.169) 
argues in talking about the UK principles-based approach: 'there is a persisting belief that 
genuine changes in corporate ethicality and attitude can only be achieved through a 
voluntary framework, which allows individuals to think about issues at hand'. 
20 
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-- -· f mix of rules and principles is still up for debate as is whether principles could 
aened to include more direction -on behaviours, culture, leadership, values and 
~: hl driving governance from the top and integrating it with the company's culture, 
e practices would prove to be more robust. Here leadership styles and role 
_ lling of behaviour are considerations discussed as important in operationalising and 
bedding gowmance practices. 
~:l ~ 
'11ie positions of the ASX and ASIC, in their roles as both guiders and monitors, are also 
~nfusing. In Australia the Corporations Act focuses on compliance and rules (albeit not as 
wide reaching as SOX 2002) whereas the role of other bodies is problematic. And when 
debate occurs in the media and business circles on the topic of strengthening the ASX' s 
and ASIC's monitoring activities, it always reverts to a discussion of whether more rules 
are actually required. 
This chapter has also highlighted the very narrow view of governance held by the general 
public with their focus on excessive compensation, umeasonable remuneration and 
unethical behaviour. Furthermore, expansion of the public's kn~wledge of governance is 
limited by the information asymmetry between those within the organisation and the 
public who rely principally on the media as their information source. This phenomenon is 
not limited to Australia and can be observed in many other countries. More guidance on 
disclosure is worth considering as a way to inform the public, in particular shareholders, 
to enhance their involvement before catastrophic and noteworthy events occur. 
Other questions then arise such as who should take responsibility for accurate and 
relevant disclosures. Eccles et al. (2001, cf Boesso & Kumar 2007) observed that a 
company with an effective corporate governance system would, by providing access to 
relevant and high quality information, make an effort to invite new forms of stakeholder 
engagement. Thus the onus appears to be squarely on the company not .only to provide 
timely disclosures but also to increase the quality and range of disclosure. Taking 
responsibility themselves at the company level for the quality and relevance of disclosure 
is likely to quieten the call for greater regulation. 
In conclusion, in moving the debate beyond the principles versus rules approach, 
governance advisers and regulators need to look at how firms can be provided with more 
guidance in operationalising the key principles that underline governance effectiveness, 
such as disclosure, remuneration, independence, stakeholder involvement and 
transparency. 
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